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Police forces are often seen as the face of the government, and sometimes the character of 
government and police action are virtually indistinguishable. The government is recognised as 
being authoritarian if its police are repressive, democratic if its police are restrained2.  
From 1926 to 1974 Portugal lived under a right-wing dictatorship. In 1926 it began as a military 
dictatorship, but after the approval of the New State constitution in 1933, it became a civil 
authoritarian regime under the leadership of Prof. Salazar. The long history of Portugal's 
dictatorship (1926-1974) defies any static definition of regime type. Scholars do not agree 
whether it belongs to the fascist type or not3, but it seems that they all agree that the police 
forces –and specially the political police (the PVDE/PIDE)– were the single most important 
political tool of the dictatorship4. At the same time, for the democratic opposition, coercion and 
fascism became almost synonyms, and as the leading historian in the field has written “the idea 
and the image of fascism were easily confounded and identified with the political police and its 
violence, because repression was the most resented face of the regime in everyday life”5.  
On the other hand, the development of policing in the western world has accompanied political 
development, and the provision of policing services and the way they are provided are often 
seen as a symbol of modern governance. In Portugal, “modernity” –a notion usually understood 
as “the way things are being done in one or another country of reference”— has been a core 
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 issue in every discussion about policing reform. Contemporary Portugal has always looked at 
other countries as inspiration for the creation of new police forces. In the 18th Century, French 
absolutism inspired the Portuguese Intendência Geral de Polícia, while in 1834 London’s 
Metropolitan Police was the inspiration of the first police force created in Lisbon by the 
Constitutional Monarchy (albeit it became a militarised police in the following years). All the 
same, after the Republican revolution of 1910, the French Gendarmerie was the model for a new 
rural constabulary, the GNR, which became the first truly national police in Portuguese history. 
The choice of one country or another as inspiration for a police reform is a technical matter, but 
as long as policing and politics go hand by hand, it is much more than that: it can serve as an 
indicator of the political system a Government wants to mirror. 
In addition, there are more international dimensions of policing other than benchmarking. 
Hatred of political repression has often influenced the views of liberal Europeans towards 
foreign policy questions, and international reputation has also been an important issue in 
government-opposition disputes6. In Portugal, the political opponents of Salazar's dictatorship 
frequently used a believed connection of the PVDE/PIDE with the German Gestapo to make 
evident a full identification of the New State with fascism, thus preventing any further 
discussion about the regime's (lack of) legitimacy7. Several works have stressed the little 
historical evidence of the “Gestapo alibi”8, but there are still a lot of issues to be addressed on 
the international dimensions of Portuguese internal policing.  
In this text I'm going to explore first some of the changing foreign policing models that the 
Portuguese police took for inspiration during the dictatorship, with a special emphasis in the 
Public Security Police (PSP). We will see that in the 1930’s the Italian fascist police had an 
important influence, but after 1945 the Portuguese dictatorship took a especial care in avoiding 
a too repressive image in the international arena. In addition we will explore this second 
dimension, the troubling reputation that harsh policing could bring to a right wing dictatorship 
after World War II, a reputation that could embarrass international cooperation when needed. 
 
The origins of the New State’s police. 
In the 1920s, the only truly national police force in Portugal was the GNR. It was a gendarmerie 
that patrolled rural areas and garrisoned the main cities. Lisbon and Porto also had significant 
civil police forces, including modern criminal police sections, but in the rest of the Portuguese 
cities there were only small urban forces closely knit to local patronage.  
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 1926 coup d’état against the Republic that resulted in the Military Dictatorship was done in the 
name of the “restoration of order”9–in contrast to the perceived social and political disorder of 
the Republic– but the military lacked any clear project of police reorganisation.  
In April 1927, George Guyomard –a French military advisor–, arrived in Lisbon with the secret 
mission of helping the dictatorship to reorganise his forces and prepare them to fight the “red 
menace” and “bolshevism”10. But he found that there was not such a menace anywhere in 
Portugal, so there were no good reasons for curtailing civil liberties. He also resented the lack of 
clear decision-making procedures in a desorganised regime that he called “a dictatorship 
without a dictator”, and he left the country despising the “selfish Portuguese military”. 
Until 1931, the police reforms consisted mostly in the replacement of the higher officers that 
were politically unsound and in the creation of an Informations Police with loose powers of 
surveillance, detention and interrogation over the political opposition. The Information Police 
became infamous because of its harsh methods, and in 1931 the International Red Aid listed 16 
workers who had been killed during detentions and tourturing11.  
 
Synopsis of the main Portuguese police forces of during the New State (1933-1974) 
Police Force. Year of 
creation* 
High 
ranks Men 
Area 
covered Functions 
PVDE 
/ PIDE 
Vigilance and 
Defence of the State 
Police 
1933* Military Civilians 
National 
and 
international 
Political police 
International police 
Passports 
PSP Public Security Police 1935* Military Civilians Urban 
Security police 
Administrative police, 
Public order 
GNR National Republican Guard 1911* Military Military 
Rural 
Portugal 
Gendarmerie force 
Security police 
Public order 
GF Fiscal Guard 1885* Military Military 
Frontiers 
Ports 
Coast 
Douanes 
PIC / 
PJ 
Criminal 
Investigation Police / 
Judiciary Police12 
1927* Judge Civilians National Criminal investigation 
 
*Every Portuguese police force has several antecedent forces. 
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Once Prof. Salazar became head of the government, he brought with him the political projects 
the military were unable to define. In 1930 he began to institutionalise a civil dictatorship, and 
in 1933 he passed the so-called New State constitution. His reforms aimed at building a State 
“so strong and irresistible that it will not need to draw on violence”, and the recipe for bringing 
life to this “strong State” comprised a further civil administration centralisation and a general 
reorganisation of the police forces.  
In 1933 a new political police, the Vigilance and Defence of the State Police (PVDE) was 
created. PVDE’s assigned functions where many and went beyond that of defence or attack on 
political oppositionists. PVDE combined the functions of criminal investigative police, 
international police, internal security and counter-intelligence, foreign intelligence, immigration 
and emigration control service, and prison administration service13.  
Two years later, in 1935, the scattered urban police forces that until then had been under the 
control of the provincial Civil Governors were merged into a national police force called the 
Public Security Police [Polícia de Segurança Pública], commonly known as the PSP. Its 
national headquarters were in Lisbon and its higher ranks were going to be filled with army 
officers. 
As long as the new centralised PSP patrolled major cities, it became the principal face of the 
State. Its higher officers, all of them military men, saw themselves as a proud part of Salazar’s 
political reconstruction of Portugal. Freed from local patronage and petty politicking, the new 
national PSP was seen as “the spearhead of Portugal’s resurgence”14. 
During the summer of 1936 Salazar created a voluntary official militia called the Portuguese 
Legion (mainly as a response to the beginning of the Spanish Civil War) and the militia had 
adopted the Roman salute and fascist-style parades, creating an external iconic identification of 
Salazar’s New State with fascism15.  
In 1937 the PSP high command began to publish a periodical called Polícia Portuguesa. It 
appeared every two months and was mainly addressed to the PSP men. Analysing the editorial 
line of Polícia Portuguesa and the topics it covers during the New State may help us to assess 
the self image of the PSP. In addition, sometimes the police officers used the pages of Polícia 
Portuguesa to express their views on police reform, even if the government seldom was 
responsive to the proposals. 
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Mussolini’s Italy: a“friendly nation”. 
During the first issues of Polícia Portuguesa, the journal published little about foreign police 
forces. Some international developments such as the use of tear gas or mobile radio-telephones 
were discussed in their pure technical value, without references to any general model of 
policing. 
But things were soon going to change: in July 1937 a big bomb had exploded in Lisbon at the 
arrival of Salazar’s car. Although the attempt failed to hurt the dictator, it revealed some 
fragilities in the preventive policing. The PVDE reacted fast and in three days announced the 
detention of the terrorist cell.  
The PVDE’s success was highly praised in the official press, but a disbelieving PSP officer 
soon discovered that everything was a farce: the supposed terrorists had confessed only after 
harsh torturing and, in reality, they had nothing to do with the anarchist underground 
organisation responsible for the bombing. Even if censorship suppressed the true story, PVDE’s 
lack of professionalism became apparent in the corridors of power16. 
As we have already mentioned, in 1927 the Portuguese government had asked France for advice 
on political policing. Now, ten years later, the Salazar turned to Mussolinis's Italy, signing a 
cooperation agreement. In august 1937, a high official from the Italian General Direction of 
Police, Leone Santoro, arrived in Lisbon with the assignment to “examine the means the New 
State has adopted in order to defend itself from communism” and “to teach the Italian 
approach”17.  
Even if political policing was Leone Santoro’s main concern, his view was that if the New State 
wanted to be a strong State, a further reorganisation of the entire police system was necessary. 
He worked on the PVDE, PSP, PIC, and GNR for two years, analysing each organization and its 
activities. He visited command offices, police stations and frontier posts; he attended drill 
sessions, field exercises, parades and theoretical lessons; he had interviews with officers and 
men, discussed with them Italian books and regulations and pronounced several lectures. At the 
end, he wrote two reports on the reorganisation of the Portuguese police. The first one dealt with 
the political police itself, the second report proposed a general reorganisation of the Portuguese 
police forces that followed what he called “the fascist teachings”. 
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 Santoro concluded that the main advantage of the Italian system was a better coordination 
between the different forces and a higher degree of professional training. He proposed the 
creation of a Directorate of Public Security with authority over every police force in Portugal 
and the unification of PVDE, PIC and PSP into a single national police. He also proposed that 
this new force should be in charge of all the administrative policing duties that were then in the 
hands of local authorities, such as granting permits and superintending marketplace 
regulations18. Finally, he proposed the creation of a Police Officer Corps independent from the 
Army Officer Corps and the improvement of training for enlisted men. 
The presence and the proposals of Leone Santoro were received with different degrees of 
enthusiasm by PVDE, PSP, PIC and GNR officers and commanders. It seems that PVDS’ high 
command resented Santoro’s interference, but Lt. Silva Pais of the PSP became fully interested 
in his proposals19. As Santoro wrote, he took “active interest in my work, demonstrating 
enthusiastically his admiration for the Italian system and expressing his support for Portugal 
adopting the Italian police law”20. Santoro even wrote to the Portuguese interior Minister that “ 
if [after my departure] your Excellency needs any other information about the Italian police law, 
you can ask to PSP’s Lt. Silva Pais, who so closely worked with me” 21.  
Silva Pais was a young military engineer that worked in the PSP headquarters attached to the 
national PSP commander. In 1937 he lead the creation of the first (but short-lived) anti-riot unit 
and fostered the use of tear gas in civil disturbances. In late 1938 he became the chief editor of 
Polícia Portuguesa. The close association of Silva Pais and Santoro was reflected in the journal, 
which started to publish devoted pieces under the title “The police forces from friendly nations: 
Italy”. Issue after issue, the Polícia Portuguesa praised the technical perfection and the “fascist 
mystique” of the Italian police22. Leone Santoro himself wrote a piece on the Italian police 
portraying “fascism” as a way of building an efficient police organisation in Latin countries 
such as Italy and Portugal23. 
This repeated presence of the Italian police as a model of modern policing in the PSP journal 
became the highest explicit identification of the Portuguese police with fascism.  
Fascists were part of the coalition that ruled Portugal, but there were also right wing 
monarchists, conservative republicans and Catholics, all bond together by their extreme 
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 nationalism, economic conservatism and the fear of social turmoil24. Once World War II started, 
Portuguese government maintained a balance between its pro-axis and its pro-allies factions, 
trying to stay neutral. During the war Polícia Portuguesa almost stopped writing any appraisal 
of other countries police forces. Only a descriptive work on the Dutch police was published in 
1941, a piece that did not even mention that the Netherlands were under German occupation25.  
 
Changing friends 
In may 1945, the democratic opposition took enthusiastically the streets welcoming the Allies’ 
victory. They interpreted Mussolini’s and Hitler’s defeat as a defeat for Salazar's dictatorship. 
But since 1943, although Portugal remained neutral, Salazar had favoured the Allies: he had 
stopped wolfram exports to Germany and conceded the Allies a valuable military base in 
Azores.  
After the war, Portuguese democratic opposition tried to isolate Portugal from the international 
forums, stressing the lack of freedoms in Portugal and that Salazar was a kind of fascist dictator. 
But the Portuguese regime also aggiorned its image and abandoned the fascist-style parades that 
had been so usual since 1936. As a response to British pressure, most of the political prisoners 
that were held in Tarrafal –an unhealthy camp in Cape Verde Islands– were brought back to 
serve their terms in Portugal26. 
Most of the changes were just token concessions. Salazar's announcement of “free elections as 
free as those in free England” was a farce, because the opposition didn’t have the right to free 
press, to held meetings, to organise political parties or to supervise vote counting. The name 
change of the political police, from PVDE to PIDE, was also a token concession in which the 
word “Vigilance” -with totalitarian resonances- was substituted by “International”. But even if 
the government presented PIDE as a fully conventional “Scotland Yard-style” investigation 
police (and it became the Portuguese Interpol correspondent), its powers of surveillance and 
detention were far greater than those of any democratic police: telephone bugs, correspondence 
violation, torturing and unlimited preventive detention of “dangerous suspects” without 
judiciary control27. 
In the PSP, past associations with fascism also became embarrassing, and Polícia Portuguesa 
changed its foreign references. In contrast to the previous eulogy of the Italian fascist police, in 
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 1945 Polícia Portuguesa initiated a new series of articles dedicated to “British police forces”, 
praising that “as it is usually known, every Englishman is rightly proud of the highly 
professional and good mannered policemen”28. In 1948 Polícia Portuguesa dedicated another 
favourable article to Scotland Yard, and from then on the PSP presented itself as a professional 
police of a similar kind of any other west-European police force. 
The aggiornamento did not mean a discrimination of pro-fascist police officers, and Silva Pais –
the most enthusiastic proponent of the fascist police in the 1930’s–, latter became the General 
Director of the political police (from 1962 to 1974). 
 
International public opinion and PSP reforms. 
During most of the 1950’s Portugal was a quiet country. Unrest was confined to the southern 
countryside, where the Communist Party was strong and landless peasants struggled for better 
wages and working conditions. In urban Portugal, the police could claim that its mission was all 
civic and in 1956 the PSP started patrolling without firearms, “like the English bobby”.  
Nevertheless, even if Salazar praised the virtues and values of poor but honest peasants, the 
country modernised. Urbanisation progressed and the productive structure was changing. In 
1958 General Delgado campaigned for president. His high level connections allowed him to 
make the most of the limited political freedoms allowed during election time, and the campaign 
produced great political mobilisation. The results were a fraud and Salazar’s appointee was 
elected, but the elections started a new cycle of social and political unrest29. Between 1958 and 
1964 there were frequent strikes and political demonstrations and the police killed at least seven 
demonstrators30.  
At the same time, the international public opinion became interested in Portugal. It was a 
colonial empire that did not agree do decolonise and a dictatorship that, even if was a member 
of NATO and EFTA, for the international liberal opinion was a remnant of the fascist Europe of 
the 1930’s31. The first Amnesty International campaign in 1961 was concerned with Portuguese 
prisoners of conscience.  
In fact, international public opinion became a key actor in Portuguese politics. First, Portugal 
needed support in the UN to resist the international condemnation of its colonial policy. Later, 
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 when the colonial war began in Africa, Portugal needed the support of its NATO allies to avoid 
arms embargoes32.. 
The coverage of 1958 repression over political demonstrations in the New York Times and other 
media had an impact, and numerous government officials were afraid that a too repressive 
image could harm Portuguese interests abroad33. In 1960 Portugal resented the lack of 
international support when a group of political opponents kidnapped a ship in international 
waters and the NATO “allies” did not treat the case as an act of piracy34. Every police report on 
policing demonstrations also expressed the concern with internal and international public 
opinion35. As a minister wrote to Salazar after violent clashes in 1962 May Day demonstrations:  
“it is necessary to graduate violence and police beatings [because] I saw several 
photographers amidst the crowd and we can expect that the pictures will appear 
tomorrow in the International Press as documents of, as they say, the terror suffered by 
Portuguese population”36 
 
Since 1958 the PSP high command had been aware of the new situation and the need to adopt a 
softer approach to the policing of demonstrations. In 1959 the PSP paid two study visits, one to 
west Germany and the other to France. The object of the visits was "to analyse the tactics 
employed in case of riots and the accessory weaponry such as batons, helmets and vehicles”37. 
Both France and Germany were now democratic countries, but as a high official said “they were 
not soft with dissidence”38. After those visits, the government approved the creation of an 
antiriot unit called Mobile Police that was a copy of a French CRS. Even the tactical 
instructions and the training manuals were translated from the French39. The British bobby was 
still used as a model for urban unarmed patrolling, but the more militarised French police was 
more akin to the Portuguese ruthless use of force against political demonstrators.  
In 1961, the beginning of the nationalist struggles in Angola, Guinea and Mozambique pressed 
for the modernisation of policing in the colonies, so 12 Mobile Police units were sent to Africa. 
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 The use of police units in Africa could embody the Portuguese official position: that there was 
not a colonial war, but a struggle between a sovereign State and some unrepresentative terrorist 
forces. Nonetheless, the police forces were not enough and the Army became fully entangled in 
a protracted war. 
 
Inspired on a democracy but undemocratic 
The specialised Mobile Police and the use of non-lethal weapons made possible that the police 
did not kill any demonstrator in metropolitan Portugal from 1964 until the end of the 
dictatorship in 1974. Nonetheless, several opponents were killed by the PIDE (renamed DGS in 
1969) or died in prison40. But the PSP, even if had a violent professional culture and often 
punished demonstrators with heavy beating, proved itself capable of weighting the amount of 
force it needed in order to disperse a crowd. The technical side of breaking demonstrations with 
non lethal weapons had been well learnt from the French model.   
In 1972, Major Baptista e Silva of the PSP paid a study visit to Paris and Madrid. Back in 
Lisbon, he wrote two valuable reports comparing the French, the Spanish and the Portuguese 
policing systems41. In the first place, he found that in the three countries the antiriot units were 
very similar, mainly because both the Spaniards and the Portuguese had adopted the 
organisation, training principles and non-lethal weapons of the French CRS. He also compared 
the policing of street demonstrations, taking note that in Franco's Spain and in Portugal alike, 
the police tried to break up any demonstration from the beginning. In France, in contrast, the 
police had to respect the right to demonstrate, so the police only intervened if the demonstrators 
acted unlawfully. Putting aside the differences over political rights in democratic and 
authoritarian policing, he underlined that 
“the study of the French case [was] the most interesting for the Portuguese police 
[because] the French police organisation is the most similar to the Portuguese […] and 
has been the model in Portugal for several police reforms in the past”.  
Finally, he noticed that societies were changing and that “everywhere individual rights are more 
and more appreciated”. In addition, “the communications revolution politicise local matters, that 
now have an impact in the international level”, so policing had to adapt to this new international 
public arena. 
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Conclusion 
As we have seen in the past pages there has been an important twofold international dimension 
in the evolution of policing in the Portuguese right-wing dictatorship.  
- The first place, there were the technical models: other countries’ experiences were taken 
into account in order to modernise policing in Portugal and better achieve government 
policing aims.  
- In the second place, the government was worried about having a politically unsound or 
a too repressive image, because repression was a political cost in international forums. 
During the 1930s the dictatorship and its police forces were not ashamed to collaborate 
with Italian fascism, but after 1945 they tried to get rid of fascist symbols without 
recognising public freedoms. 
The two changes of name of the political police (1945 and 1969) were only token adjustments to 
deceive international public opinion. But worries about the political costs of the most 
spectacular repression (killing people in pacific street demonstrations), led to the 
implementation of well proved non-lethal antiriot tactics imported from France. This adoption 
meant a drastic reduction of street casualties, but had nothing to do with democratisation, 
because the right to demonstrate was not recognised. 
Political Science has stressed that democratic institutions increase the cost of using repressive 
behaviour42. This text has also explored the possibility that a dictatorship may be compelled to 
restrain some repressive behaviour because of the need of international recognition.  
 
22 February 2007. 
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